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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Urrabazo appeals from the district courts orders relinquishing jurisdiction
entered after Urrabazo served two consecutive periods of retained jurisdiction
without an intervening period of probation, contrary to I.C. § 19-2601(4).

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On May 18, 2005, the state charged Urrabazo with statutory rape in
Docket No. 33459. (#33459 R, ppA0-41.) On June 30, 2005, the state charged
Urrabazo with two counts of felony battery on a law enforcement officer and one
count of misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer in Docket No. 33460.
(#33460 R, pp.35-36.) Pursuant to a joint plea agreement, Urrabazo pled guilty
to statutory rape, one felony count of battery on a law enforcement officer, and to
the misdemeanor battery on a law enforcement officer. (#33460 8/8/05 Tr., p.5,
Ls.3-12, p.7, L.22 - p.9, L.23.) The court imposed a unified ten-year sentence
with three years fixed for statutory rape and a concurrent unified five-year
sentence with three. years fixed for felony battery on a law enforcement officer. 1
(#33459 R, pp.78-79; #33460 R., pp.51-52.)

The court, however, retained

jurisdiction in both cases. (Id.)
At the end of the first period of retained jurisdiction, the court held- a
hearing at which time it took the matter under advisement and continued the
hearing for four days. (#33459 R, p.83; #33460 R, p.59; 5/1/06 Tr., p.23, L.23-

1 The court also imposed a concurrent 180-day sentence on the misdemeanor
charge. (#33460 R, p.49.)
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p.25, L.16.) At the second hearing, held May 5, 2006, Urrabazo requested Rule
35 relief in the form of a "second rider," which the court granted. (#33459 R,
pp.84-86; #33460 R, pp.61-63; #33460 Tr., p.42, Ls.20-22, p.43, L.20 - p.46,
L.12.) On July 28, 2006, 253 days after entering judgment, the court relinquished
jurisdiction in both cases and ordered Urrabazo's sentences executed. (#33459

R, pp.91-94; #33460 R, pp.67-70.) Urrabazo filed a timely notice of appeal from
the order relinquishing jurisdiction in both cases and the cases have been
consolidated for purposes of appeal. (#33459 R, pp. 96-97; #33460 R., pp.7273; Order Granting Motion to Consolidate and Suspend dated February 12,
2007.)
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ISSUES
Urrabazo states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction over Mr. Urrabazo?

2.

Was the sentence imposed by the district court excessive
and therefore an abuse of the court's discretion?

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case and hold that I.C. § 192601 (4) prohibits a district from ordering two consecutive periods of retained
jurisdiction without an intervening period of probation and that such prohibition is
jurisdictional? Should the Court further hold that even if I.C. § 19-2601(4) is not
jurisdictional, it cannot extend the time for filing an appeal set forth in IAR.
14(a)?
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ARGUMENT
Pursuant To I.C. § 19-2601(4), A District Court Exceeds Its Jurisdiction When It
Orders Consecutive Periods Of Retained Jurisdiction And An Unlawful Extension
Of Jurisdiction Does Not Extend The Time For Filing An Appeal

A.

Introduction
Immediately after Urrabazo served his first period of retained jurisdiction,

the district court retained jurisdiction over Urrabazo for a second consecutive
period before ultimately relinquishing jurisdiction.

On appeal,

Urrabazo

complains that the district court erred in relinquishing jurisdiction and claims his
sentences are excessive.

(Appellant's Brief, ppA-12.)

This Court cannot

consider the merits of Urrabazo's claims on appeal, however, because the district
court lacked jurisdiction to order a successive period of retained jurisdiction and
its illegal extension of its jurisdiction cannot extend the time for filing an appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The construction and application of a statute presents a question of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review.

State v. Robinson, 143

Idaho 306, 307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,
362,79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003). "Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of
law that may be raised at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free
review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755,757,101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004) (citation
omitted).
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C.

I.C. § 19-2601(4) Does Not Permit A Court To Order Successive Periods
Of Retained Jurisdiction
The authority of a sentencing court to retain jurisdiction over a defendant

committed to the custody of the board of correction stems from Idaho Code § 192601(4), which provides, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of
guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime
against the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the
court in its discretion, may:
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the
first one hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of
the state board of correction. The court shall retain jurisdiction over
the prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) days or, if the
prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches twenty-one (21)
years of age. The prisoner will remain committed to the board of
correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by the court. In
extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it is
unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the
one hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or
where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable
to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such
period, the court may decide whether to place the defendant on
probation or release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to
exceed thirty (30) days, after the one hundred eighty day (180)
period of retained jurisdiction has expired. Placement on probation
shall be under such terms and conditions as the court deems
necessary and expedient. The court in its discretion may sentence
a defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after
a defendant has been placed on probation in a case ....
I.C. § 19-2601(4) as amended by 2005 Sess. Laws, ch. 186, § 1 at 572.
The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of a
statute. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360,362,79 P.3d 719,721 (2003). Those
words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning and the statute
must be construed as a whole. ll;l Where the language of a statute is plain and
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unambiguous, the court must give effect to the statute as written, without
engaging in statutory construction.

State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988

P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 P.2d 578, 581
(1996): The court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in
the statute, unless the result is "palpably absurd." Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362,
79 P.3d at 721; Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688.
The statute in this case is clear.

Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) permits a

sentencing court to "sentence a defendant to more than one (1) period of
retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation in a
case." (Emphasis added.) As written, the statute unambiguously authorizes a
district court to sentence a defendant to more than one period of retained
jurisdiction only if, after the first retained jurisdiction period, the defendant has
been placed on probation.
That the legislature intended the "after a defendant has been placed on
probation in a case" language of I.C. § 19-2601(4) as a limitation on the court's
authority to order a second period of retained jurisdiction, is evident when the
statute is construed as a whole. Idaho Code § 19-2601(4) expressly permits a
district court to suspend execution of the judgment and retain jurisdiction over a
prisoner for the first 180 days of the prisoner's sentence. As has been previously
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the authority
granted by I.C. § 19-2601(4) is unique, in that it essentially enables the district
court and the board of correction to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over a
defendant who has been committed to the custody of the board. State v, Diggie,
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140 Idaho 238, 240, 91 P.3d 1142, 1144 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Williams, 126
Idaho 39,44,878 P.2d 213, 218 (Ct. App. 1994). Pursuant to the plain language
of the statute, however, the court's jurisdiction is limited to the "first one hundred
eighty (180) days of a sentence." I.C. § 19-2601(4}; State v. Taylor, 142 Idaho
30,31,121 P.3d 961, 962 (2005); Diggie, 140 Idaho at 240,91 P.3d at 1144. If,
within the first 180 days, the court does not affirmatively place the defendant on
probation, the court's jurisdiction expires, and the defendant will remain
committed to the board of correction.

kl

It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that a statute must
be construed so that effect is given to every word, clause and sentence of the
statute. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360,365, 128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005); State v.
Baer, 132 Idaho 416, 417-18, 973 P.3d 768, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1999). Giving
effect to every word, clause and sentence of Idaho Code § 19-2601(4}, it is clear
that the legislature did not intend to give sentencing courts the authority to order
immediately successive periods of retained jurisdiction without an intervening
period of probation. To the contrary, by providing that a "prisoner will remain
committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on probation by
the court," the legislature specifically limited the ability of sentencing courts to do
anything other than place the defendant on probation or relinquish jurisdiction
(either expressly or by operation of law) at the end of a retained jurisdiction
period. Taylor, 142 Idaho at 31, 121 P.3d at 962. Unless a court affirmatively
places the defendant on probation at the end of the retained jurisdiction period, it
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loses jUrisdiction over the defendant and, as such, has no authority to order a
second period of retained jurisdiction.
If a defendant need not serve a period of probation before a second period
of retained jurisdiction can be ordered, district courts will be able to extend their
jurisdiction in perpetuity by the mere expedient of ordering multiple consecutive
periods of retained jurisdiction.

Such a result is patently contrary both to the

legislature's clearly expressed intent and to this Court's prior precedent relating
to the ability of sentencing courts to retain jurisdiction for more than 180 days.
See,

~,

Taylor, 142 Idaho at 31-32, 121 P.3d at 962-63.

Because I.C. § 19-2601(4) prohibits successive periods of retained
jurisdiction, the district court erred by doing so in this case.

D.

I.C. § 19-2601(4) Is Jurisdictional
While the Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion agreeing with the

state's position that "a district court may order a second period of retained
jurisdiction only after a defendant has been placed on an intervening period of
probation," the court, in that same opinion, also concluded the district court's lack
of authority to order a successive period of retained jurisdiction is not "a question
of jurisdiction," nor does it affect the timeliness of an appeal. State v. Barclay,
Docket No. 33602, 2008 Opinion No. 90 at pA and n.3 (Idaho App. October 22,
2008).2 Thus, the court determined, it could "address the merits of Barclay's
appeal.,,3 !Q." This conclusion is incorrect.

Approximately eight months prior to issuing its opinion in Barclay, the court of
appeals issued an opinion in State v. Blanc, Docket No. 33879, 2008 Opinion No.
2
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Contrary to the court of appeals' decision in Barclay, I.C. § 19-2601(4) is
undoubtedly jurisdictional. Indeed, the court of appeals' conclusion that a district
court could not impose successive periods of retained jurisdiction was dependent
upon its recognition that "[a)bsent inherent power, a sentencing court has only
the authority granted by the legislature." Barclay, slip op. at 4 (citing State v.
Funk, 123 Idaho 967, 969, 855 P.2d 52, 54 (1993)). State v. Armstrong, Docket
No. 33868, 2008 Opinion No. 80 (Idaho App. August 15, 2008), petition for

review pending, which the court of appeals relied on to conclude I.C. § 192601 (4) does not present a question of jurisdiction or affect the timeliness of an
appeal, Barclay, slip pp. at 4 n.3, does not hold otherwise.
The question before the court of appeals in Armstrong was whether the
district court lacked jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his guilty plea

20 (Idaho App. February 8, 2008), reaching the opposite conclusion, i.e., holding
that a district court could retain jurisdiction for two successive periods without an
intervening period of probation. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the state's
petition for review in Blanc and this case was stayed pending that decision.
(Order Granting Motion To Suspend The Briefing Schedule dated April 24, 2008.)
However, while on review, Blanc filed a motion to dismiss her appeal and vacate
the court of appeals' opinion, which the Idaho Supreme Court granted. (Order to
Withdraw Opinion In Appeal No. 33879 And To Dismiss Appeal Nos. 33879 And
35399 dated September 9, 2008.) Thus, although the court of appeals reversed
course in Barclay, the Idaho Supreme Court has yet to address the issue
presented and the state encourages it to do so now, particularly in light of the
court of appeals' conclusion in Barclay that the court's authority under I.C. § 192601(4) is not jurisdictional. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987, 842
P.2d 660, 666 (1992). ("To this Court falls the obligation to be and remain the
ultimate authority in fashioning, declaring, amending, and discarding rules,
principles, and doctrines of precedential law by application of which the lower
courts will fashion their decisions.")
3 In addressing the merits, the court (1) rejected Barclay's challenge to the court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction because "the district court lacked the statutory
authority to order a second period of retained jurisdiction without an intervening
period of probation," and (2) concluded Barclay's sentence was not excessive.
Barclay. slip op. at 5-6.
9

after the state alleged he violated his probation even though the judgment
entered upon his plea had become final as a result of Armstrong's failure to file
an appeal. Armstrong, slip op. at 2-3. The state argued on appeal that, pursuant
to State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352,79 P.3d 711 (2003), the district court lacked
jurisdiction to permit withdrawal of Armstrong's guilty plea and "that all of the
subsequent proceedings in the district court were without jurisdiction, and that all
subsequent orders [were] void." !9.,. at 3. After a lengthy discussion regarding
the meaning of jurisdiction and the imprecise use of that word, the court of
appeals concluded that because Jakoski made clear that a "trial court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction," as opposed to personal jurisdiction, "to grant a motion
for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the judgment of conviction becomes final," the
state's "jurisdictional" argument was, in fact, a legitimate one. !9.,. at 9.
In Barclay, the court of appeals, although citing to Armstrong, did not
explain why it necessarily follows that I.C. § 19-2601 (4) is not jurisdictional. It
merely said it is not. Barclay, slip op. at 4 n.3. However, there is no basis for
concluding the reasoning of Jakoski does not apply to this case.
In Jakoski, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "Jurisdiction over the subjectmatter is the abstract power to hear a case of a particular kind and character"
and noted that although Article V, § 20 of the Idaho Constitution, "grants district
courts the power to hear all types of cases ... lilt does not grant them perpetual
jurisdiction to amend or set aside final judgments in cases that they have heard."
139 Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714. Jakoski is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's definition of subject matter jurisdiction as the "statutory or
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constitutional power to adjudicate the case." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 630 (2002). Application of the definition of subject matter jurisdiction to this
case reveals the issue presented here is indeed a jurisdictional one.
The only "power" district courts have to retain jurisdiction over a defendant
is granted by I.C. § 19-2601(4). Taylor, 142 Idaho at 31,121 P.3d at 962; Diggie,
140 Idaho at 240,91 P.3d at 1144; Williams, 126 Idaho at 44,878 P.2d at 218.
Once the period of retained jurisdiction authorized by I.C. § 19-2601(4) expires,
and the district court has failed to affirmatively place the defendant on probation,
the district court no longer has the "power" to do so. A district court that purports
to do so is acting without jurisdiction. Cf. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354,
825 P.2d 74, 77 (1992) (If a trial court fails to rule upon a Rule 35 motion "within
a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses
jurisdiction.")
Because the district court did not have the legislatively granted "power" to
order a successive period of retained jurisdiction in this case, the court's efforts
to do so exceeded its jurisdiction and the order purporting to do so, as well as,
the order relinquishing jurisdiction are void and of no legal effect. As such, this
Court should decline to consider the merits of the court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction.

E.

A District Court Cannot Extend The Time For Filing An Appeal By
Unlawfully Extending Its Jurisdiction
Even if this Court determines that a district court's attempt to unlawfully

retain jurisdiction does not present "a question of jurisdiction," Barclay, slip op. at

11

4 n.3, an unlawful retention of jurisdiction does not extend the time for filing an
appeal. Rule 14(a), IAR., provides:
Any appeal as a matter of right from the district court may be made
only by physically filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the
district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing
stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment, order or decree of
the district court appealable as a matter of right in any civil or
criminal action .... In a criminal case, the time to file an appeal is
enlarged by the length of time the district court actually retains
jurisdiction pursuant to Idaho Code. When the court releases its
retained jurisdiction or places the defendant on probation, the time
within which to appeal shall commence to run.
(Emphasis added.)
Under I.C. § 19-2601 (4), a district court can only "actually retain[]
jurisdiction" for a maximum of 180 days after entry of judgment or 210 days in
extraordinary circumstances. As such, if a defendant who receives the benefit of
retained jurisdiction wishes to appeal his sentence, he must file a notice of
appeal within 42 days of the date the period of retained jurisdiction ends either by
. operation of law or sooner if the court relinquishes jurisdiction or places him on
probation before the end of the 180-day (or 210-day) period.
In this case, Urrabazo did not file his notices of appeal until September 8,
2006 (#33459 R., p.96, #33460 R., p.72), 42 days after the court purported to
relinquish jurisdiction (#33459 R., p.67, #33460 R., p.91). However, the actual
period of retained jurisdiction permitted under I.C. § 19-2601(4) ended May 16,
2006, 180 days after the court entered judgment on November 17, 2005, making
Urrabazo's notices of appeal from the imposition of sentence due no later than
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June 27, 2006. 4 Urrabazo's notices of appeal were, therefore, untimely as to the
entry of judgment.
Because the district court cannot extend the time to appeal by unlawfully
retaining jurisdiction and because Urrabazo's notices of appeal were not timely
filed from the actual period the court could retain jurisdiction, his appeal in
relation to his sentences must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court hold that because the district
court lacked jurisdiction to order successive periods of retained jurisdiction
without an intervening period of probation, it lacked jurisdiction to place Urrabazo
on probation when it entered its order relinquishing jurisdiction; as such, the
district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction is not subject to review.

The

state further requests this Court dismiss as untimely Urrrabazo's appeals of his
sentences.
DATED this 12th day of November, 2008.

JES
Dep

4 Even if this Court interprets the district court's comments at the original
jurisdictional review hearings as invoking the additional 30 days permitted by I.C.
§ 19-2601(4), Urrabazo's appeals from his sentences are still untimely because
they would have been due July 27,2006.
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